本文由东方汇理资产管理香港有限公司授权云锋金融集团有限公司独家发布
东方汇理资产管理香港有限公司属于Amundi集团——Amundi是欧洲领先的九游体育资产管理公司，资产管理规模为欧洲第一。Amundi集团具体资产管理类别主要分为：债券、股票、另类资产、结构性资产等。
蜫照騻~?韫M?? X?4??N╞断關4?齴妔蜫照騻~?韫M?? X?4??N╞断關4?齴妔
1982年，Amundi集团开始在亚洲拓展业务，同年，在香港成立全资附属公司——东方汇理资产管理香港有限公司；之后Amundi集团又在亚洲多地设立全资或合资企业，逐渐成为亚洲地区举足轻重的资产管理公司。
以下中文观点摘要由云锋金融整理：
根据经合组织（OECD)和欧盟的众多报告和调查，法国经济主要存在三方面的结构性问题：第一、僵化的劳动力市场机制；第二、极不均衡的公共开支和税收分配制度；第三、低效的产品和服务市场。
目前四个主要的总统候选人，在针对这些问题上有着截然不同的应对框架和重要度排序。勒庞拒绝承认这些结构性问题的存在，对经合组织和欧盟所倡导的自由市场法则更是嗤之以鼻。哈蒙则无视大部分的问题，主张在财政开支上更加激进，向选民许诺了慷慨的社会福利。
另一方面，菲永和马克龙的政策框架对这些结构性问题有所应对，但在优先级的选择上截然不同。菲永强调第二点，主张优先削减公共开支并实施减税政策，而马克龙更重视第一和第三点，希望先增强劳动力、产品及服务市场的弹性和竞争力。
以下是英文正文：
This note which focuses on the French economy’s structural problems and the top four presidential candidates’ platforms is the third in a series that will accompany you until the results of the presidential and legislative elections (and probably a little further).九游体育下载
Voting polls: where do we stand?
Sources: KANTAR - SOFRES - Onepoint, Amundi Research
Sources: KANTAR - SOFRES - onepoint, Amundi Research
Sources: KANTAR - SOFRES - Onepoint, Amundi Research Sources BVA (18th March 2017), Amundi Research
Key points
A number of reports and surveys have pointed out the numerous structural inefficiencies of the French economy, which generally revolve around three themes:1/ a rigid labour market; 2/ the excessive weight and poor distribution of public spending and taxes; 3/ inefficiencies on product and service markets.
The main presidential candidates’ platforms diverge in terms of acknowledgement of these obstacles and of their relative importance. Marine Le Pen’s programme mostly turns its back on the free-market-oriented findings of international organisations. Benoit Hamon’s rejects many of these views as well, particularly on the fiscal component. The programmes of François Fillon and Emmanuel Macron retain a large portion of the conclusions but differ widely in their priorities (with a preference for cuts in spending and tax for Fillon, for a “flexicurity” approach for Macron).
I- Structural obstacles: an economy undermined by many rigidities
The purpose of this note is to present:
1) the structural obstacles often mentioned by international organisations (whose comments are picked up by the financial community);
and 2) the stances of the main presidential candidates: François Fillon (a conservative-right Republican), Emmanuel Macron (of the centre-moderate left “En marche!” movement), Benoît Hamon (a Socialist) and Marine Le Pen (of the far right National Front). The findings of international organisations are being hushed up (rejected?) by certain candidates (including Le Pen), more or less ignored by others (including Hamon), and somewhat integrated in the platforms of Fillon and Macron, but with very different priorities. This provides a basis on which to compare the platforms with regards to the reforms to be carried out.
France is a country whose potential GDP growth is estimated at 1.2% per year by the European Commission, same as the Eurozone at large. It usually receives an average score (among developed economies) in widely followed surveys focused on competitiveness (the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index… see charts). The OECD’s annual Going for Growth survey (whose purpose is to assess reforms desired and already executed in member-countries) placed France in 2016 in the “Group 4” of developed countries, alongside Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Slovenia. The main weakness of these countries is “a high level of unemployment and an early exit from the labour market” and their main strength is “a high level of productivity”. Note however, that in 2017 the OECD identified France as a country where the pace of growth-friendly reforms accelerated in the 2015-2016 period vs that of 2013-2014, while it decelerated, on average, across developed economies (See: EconomicPolicy Reforms: Going for Growth. Overview of structural reform progress andidentifying priorities in 2017, OECD, 2017.).
Economic policy reforms 2016: going for growth interim report_ OECD 2016.
Source: World Economic Forum, Amundi Research
Source: World Bank, Amundi Research
In fact, the French economy’s structural problems have been subject to many detailed assessments, regularly carried out by major international organisations or as part of reports commissioned by the government or carried out by various think tanks. Many obstacles to a stronger economic growth are usually identified, but they can, in general, be classified into three major themes clearly announced in the “main findings” of the OECD’s 2015 survey on France:
“The key challenge is to reform the labour market to promote job growth.”
“Public spending is too high.”
“Product-market weaknesses also undermine economic performance.”
Many figures come in support of these three findings:
Regarding the labour market, France indeed shows a wide dichotomy between the security enjoyed by full-time workers (see graph below) and those under temporary contracts. Remember that, while this view is not shared by the consensus of public opinion (not even among economists), the most common reasoning within organisations like the OECD or the European Commission is that barriers to firing permanent employees also raise obstacles to hiring. The governance and insufficient quality controls of the vocational education system is also seen as a major weakness. In terms of results, while France does indeed have an unemployment rate above the OECD average (although far from being the highest), it also stands out as a country where workers have a very low probability of switching from one job to another (See The insand outs of employment in 25 OECD countries, OECD Economics DepartmentWorking Papers, No 1350, November 2016.).
Source: OECD indicators of employment protection, 2013, Amundi Research
Source: OECD, The ins and outs employment in 25 OECD Countries, 2016, Amundi Research
As for the weight of public spending and government revenues, France ranks second among developed countries at, respectively, in 2015, 57% of GDP for spending and 53.5% for revenues (only Finland has higher ratios). As shown in a chart below, it is not so much the weight of central government that sets France off from other comparable countries, but, rather, social welfare spending (beginning with pensions) and local governments. The latter point is worth making: French communes represent 27% of the municipalities in the OECD (the United States and Japan included) and 41% of those of the European Union(See The insand outs of employment in 25 OECD countries, OECD Economics DepartmentWorking Papers, No 1350, November 2016.). In addition to seeing this economic weight of government as one of the main obstacles to the economy, international organisations point out the far-from-optimal structure of taxes and public spending. They notably stress that the share of taxes on labour is excessive, while social welfare spending, in particular, is often considered to be poorly targeted.
Source: OECD, The ins and outs employment in 25 OECD Countries, 2016, Amundi Research
Source: Eurostat, Amundi calculations
Inefficiencies on the products market are harder to quantify but are still measured by different indicators.In this area, OECD highlights that “Weak competition in some industries raises prices and costs, and undermines economic efficiency, potential output and purchasing power” , that “complexity in setting up a business and paying taxes are still constraining factors” and that “controls imposed on professions can seem to be disproportionate to the stated public objectives.” While France does not suffer from an exceptional level of inefficiency on all product markets (especially compared to Germany), studies reveal that restrictions on competition are high in some sectors, starting with those where public monopolies exist or where strong regulatory barriers to entry give excessive protection to incumbent professionals.
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation indicators, Amundi Research
It is true, however, that those reports also highlight the French economy’s many assets(we will give more detail on this topic in another note).
The strong points acknowledged by international observersinclude, in addition to relatively high productivity:
?an above-average labour force participation of persons aged 25 to 54 (while participation of younger and older persons is weak)
?a solid banking system
?a high level of education (although it is seen as uneven, and with insufficient links between the education and the corporate sectors)
?an efficient healthcare system and good transport infrastructures.
France also offers favourable demographics and a level of social inequalities not higher than the OECD’s average. However this latter point, which is due mostly to the extensive social welfare mechanism, cannot hide the fact that, in France, inequalities tend to be more often passed on within families than within other countries (see chart).
Source: Going for growth, OECD, 2010, Chapter 4: A family affair, Amundi Research, A higher indicator indicates a lower social mobility
To go back to the issue of structural obstacles, note that a convergence in viewpoints to identifying them does not mean an agreement on the level of priority that must be given to each of them. This certainly applies to the three major areas of the labour market, the economic weight of the government, and the products and services market. To simplify, let’s say that one approach prioritises public spending cuts and tax cuts (the “traditional” right approach), while another focuses on increasing flexibility and competition in the labour, products and services markets, and intends to revise the state’s weight more from a qualitative than from a quantitative point of view (the “flexicurity” approach). This is mainly where the platforms of Fillon and Macron diverge.
II- The platforms of the main presidential candidates address these obstacles in very different ways
Of the main candidates’ platforms, two give no or only very partial recognition to the aforementioned obstacles, and two do acknowledge them but with very different priorities.
Le Pen and Hamon’s platforms are along lines that are at odds with most international organisations’ recommendations, albeit to very different degrees and with radically opposing inspirations.
Generally speaking, Le Pen’s programme turns its back on the free-market principles defended by organisations such as the OECD and the European Commission.In fiscal policy, Le Pen states she wants to reduce the weight of mandatory contributions while raising some social welfare spending. However, her economic program is marked by a heavy dose of protectionism (going as far as a possible exit from the EU) and a heavier state hand in organising economic sectors, which is not favourable to increased competition. She also wants to revoke the 2016 labour market reforms put through during Hollande’s term of office.
Hamon’s leftist programme diverges from international organizations’ recommendations mainly regarding fiscal policy. Indeed, it includes an aggressive social welfare component (including opening gradually the door to a universal income) that involves at least an initial increase in the weight of public spending. Hamon plans to renegotiate European deficit rules (considering that they should not apply to infrastructure and defence spending) and to put through new taxes (including on robots and banks). Other plans call for denouncing the free-trade agreement with Canada, and the draft TAFTA (Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area) and TISA (the international Trade in Services Agreement). Moreover, Hamon also wants to revoke the 2016 labour market reform, as the lack of flexibility of the labour market is not seen as the main cause of unemployment (which is rather addressed through an increase in public investment, education and innovation). However, some measures in his platform, involving freelance worker protection and a revamp in professional training, for example, are in line with the improvement of the mobility of workers across sectors, a key subject for international organizations.
Fillon and Macron’s platforms, conversely, do directly take on at least some of the obstacles mentioned above. But their agendas still diverge widely in their inspirations and priorities.
Fillon, the representative of the traditional right, gives priority to the reduction in the level of mandatory contributions and public spending. One of his most prominent commitments is to generate 100bn in public spending savings by the end of his term, mainly by eliminating 500,000 civil-servant jobs and pushing back the retirement age. In addition to cutting the deficit, these savings would be earmarked toward funding another key promise – cutting taxes by an amount of 50bn, mostly in favour of corporations (in order to generate a positive cost-competitiveness shock) but also of households. Labour market flexibility only comes in second place (with measures to ease layoffs and a new job contract with pre-set termination clauses). However, while important parts of the public sector would be reformed (notably the education system, where the autonomy and evaluation of institutions must be strengthened) there is little emphasis on increasing competition and eliminating rent-seeking situations on products and services markets provided by the private sector (recall that part of Fillon’s electoral base is made up of independent professionals who are often reluctant to see their sectors open up to competition).
The opposite applies with Macron, who is taking a “flexicurity” approach(that is more Nordic than UK/US). It focuses on innovation, labour flexibility and mobility, greater competition, and the development of new sectors, which implies giving up propping up incumbents and existing jobs at all costs. However these changes are to be accompanied with a revamped yet still generous social safety net (including expanding some mechanisms in order to encourage risk-taking, for example paying jobless benefits to workers who resign on their own accord or self-employed workers). In the fiscal area, targeted savings on public spending (60bn over the five-year term) are far lower than those announced by Fillon, and public-sector job cuts, considerably less (120,000, a figure not announced as a firm target). These savings would be also partly compensated by a 50bn investment plan aiming at increasing “all citizens’s skills” and modernizing the economy. Similarly, only 20bn in tax cuts are targeted, roughly evenly across corporations and households. Far more than sheer numbers, Macron wants to alter the structure of taxes and social contributions, notably by converting unemployment and sickness contributions into centralized taxes and broadening their base, and by narrowing the wealth tax so that it is only levied on “real estate rent”. He would embrace a similar approach to the pension system (modifying the structure rather than the sheer amounts of pensions and the age of retirement).
Conclusion
So the four main presidential candidates do not all acknowledge the validity of the findings of major international organisations regarding France. However, of the two candidates whose programmes appear to be in phase with these findings, there are significant differences with regard to the priority being given – in one case to reducing public spending and taxes, and in the other case, to increasing mobility, flexibility and competition on the labour, product and service markets.
In any case, remember that the French president’s constitutional powers in fiscal matters and economic reforms are quite limited. To put his plans through, the new president will need a government inclined to follow along. Thus, the future president’s party (or movement) will have to obtain a majority in the June legislative elections or, at the very least, a score high enough to serve as the lead partner in a coalition.
Related Article：
《法国大选是否将飞出第一只黑天鹅？来自欧洲资管巨头东方汇理的深度解析》
In the European Union, this document is only for the attention of “Professional” investor as defined in Directive 2004/39/EC dated 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (“MIFID”), to investment services providers and any other professional of the financial industry, and as the case may be in each local regulations and, as far as the offering in Switzerland is concerned, a “Qualified Investor” within the meaning of the provisions of the Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Act of 23 June 2006 (CISA), the Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Ordinance of 22 November 2006 (CISO) and the FINMA’s Circular 08/8 on Public Advertising under the Collective Investment Schemes legislation of 20 November 2008. In no event may this material be distributed in the European Union to non “Professional” investors as defined in the MIFID or in each local regulation, or in Switzerland to investors who do not comply with the definition of “qualified investors” as defined in the applicable legislation and regulation. This document neither constitutes an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell a product, and shall not be considered as an unlawful solicitation or an investment advice. Amundi accepts no liability whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, that may arise from the use of information contained in this material. Amundi can in no way be held responsible for any decision or investment made on the basis of information contained in this material. The information contained in this document is disclosed to you on a confidential basis and shall not be copied, reproduced, modified, translated or distributed without the prior written approval of Amundi, to any third person or entity in any country or jurisdiction which would subject Amundi or any of “the Funds”, to any registration requirements within these jurisdictions or where it might be considered as unlawful. Accordingly, this material is for distribution solely in jurisdictions where permitted and to persons who may receive it without breaching applicable legal or regulatory requirements. The information contained in this document is deemed accurate as at the date of publication set out on the last page of this document. Data, opinions and estimates may be changed without notice. You have the right to receive information about the personal information we hold on you. You can obtain a copy of the information we hold on you by sending an email to info@amundi.com. If you are concerned that any of the information we hold on you is incorrect, please contact us at info@amundi.com. Credit photo Alexandre Guirkinger.
注：封面图片来自界面。
免责声明
投资涉及风险
敬请投资者注意，证券及投资的价值可升亦可跌
过往的表现不一定可以预示日后的表现
云锋金融之证券交易服务由云锋证券有限公司（以下简称“云锋证券”）提供。本文件由瑞东金融市场有限公司（以下简称“瑞东金融”）编制及授权发布于本平台，所载资料可能以若干假设为基础，仅供参考之用途，会因经济、市场及其他九游体育官网情况而随时更改而毋须另行通知。本文件所载的意见可能与云锋金融集团其他业务或其联营公司发表的意见有别。任何媒体、网站或个人未经授权不得转载、链接、转贴或以其他方式复制发表本文件及任何內容。已获授权者，在使用本文件及任何内容时必须注明稿件来源于云锋金融，并承诺遵守相关法例及一切使用互联网的国际惯例，不为任何非法目的或以任何非法方式使用本文件，违者将依法追究相关法律责任。本文件所引用之数据或資料可能得自第三方，云锋金融将尽可能确认资料来源之可靠性，但云锋金融并不对第三方所提供数据或资料之准确性负责，且云锋金融不会就本文件所载任何资料、预测及／或意见的公平性、准确性、时限性、完整性或正确性，以及任何该等预测及／或意见所依据的基准作出任何明文或暗示的保证、陈述、担保或承诺而负责或承担法律责任。本文件中如有类似前瞻性陈述之內容，此等内容或陈述不得视为对任何将来表现之保證，且应注意实际情况或发展可能与该等陈述有重大落差。本文件并非及不应被视为邀约、招揽、邀请、建议买卖任何投资产品或投资决策之依据，亦不应被诠释为专业意见。阅览本文件的人士或在作出任何投资决策前，应完全了解其风险以及有关法律、赋税及会计的特点及后果，并根据个人的情况决定投资是否切合个人的投资目标，以及能否承担有关风险，必要时应寻求适当的专业意见。在若干国家，传阅及分派本文件的方式可能受法律或规例所限制。获取本文件的人士须知悉及遵守该等限制。
“云锋金融”及相关标志为云锋金融集团所拥有。瑞东金融(证监会中央编号AAB449)及云锋证券(证监会中央编号:AYT670)均为根据《证券及期货条例》获准从事受规管活动之持牌法团，且其控股股东均为香港云锋金融集团有限公司。云锋金融集团有限公司为香港联合证券交易所有限公司主板之上市公司，股票代码为00376。
发表评论